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Deliberative Processes, Not Just More Evidence on Cost-Effectiveness
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Abstract
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) can help countries attain and sustain universal health coverage (UHC), as 
long as it is context-specific and considered within deliberative processes at the country level. Institutionalising 
robust deliberative processes requires significant time and resources, however, and countries often begin by 
demanding evidence (including local CEA evidence as well as evidence about local values), whilst striving to 
strengthen the governance structures and technical capacities with which to generate, consider and act on such 
evidence. In low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), such capacities could be developed initially around a 
small technical unit in the health ministry or health insurer. The role of networks, development partners, and 
global norm setting organisations is crucial in supporting the necessary capacities.
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Commentary
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B
altussen et al1 argue against an ever growing volume of 
one-size-fits-all cost-effectiveness data for supporting 
healthcare decisions en route to universal health 
coverage (UHC). Instead, they propose what they describe 
as “evidence-informed deliberative processes” which 
acknowledge the complex politics involved in making such 
decisions. Although little empirical evidence exists as to the 
effectiveness of deliberative processes or their impact on the 
quality of the decision reached,2 it is plausible to suppose 
that deliberation “as an aid to thought and judgment” and 
“compared with a ‘closed door’ or ad hoc process” will be 
“more comprehensive in the relevant issues embraced, more 
consistent in the way they are embraced and more engaging of 
the people affected by the outcome.”3 
Consistent with that belief, national institutions responsible 
for setting priorities for public spending in healthcare, which 
use evidence and due process, have emerged in several 
countries. These are mostly high-income ones – including 
England and Wales (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence, NICE),4 Canada (Canadian Agency for Drugs and 
Technologies in Health, CADTH)5 and the Republic of Korea 
(National Evidence-based Healthcare Collaborating Agency, 
NECA),6 as well as more recently in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) including Thailand (Health Interventions 
and Technology Assessment Program, HITAP7) and Brazil 
(National Committee for Technology Incorporation, 
CONITEC).8,9 These organisations are often known as health 
technology assessment (HTA) agencies, with “technology” 
often being much broader than drugs or devices to encompass 
policies and delivery platforms. Moreover, their function and 
structure are strongly dependent upon the healthcare system 
within which they operate. Most explicitly consider cost-
effectiveness evidence in their decision-making as well as 
evidence in the broadest sense, including so-called colloquial 
evidence on social values and service user perspectives.3 As 
interest in more systematic approaches to allocating resources 
grows, a global development subfield has evolved including 
World Health Organization (WHO) CHOICE10 and Disease 
Control Priorities (DCP),11 both of which produce global 
evidence and guidance about “globally” cost-effective health 
interventions. Baltussen et al1 claim that these global trends 
ignore the local political economy of priority setting and are 
therefore, unlikely to influence the actual allocation of scarce 
healthcare resources in LMICs. We agree. 
Better decisions about priorities for resource allocation, 
based on comparative evidence of costs and benefits, and that 
are feasible and implementable, are becoming increasingly 
possible in the current move towards UHC.12 Many LMICs 
are experiencing rapid economic growth, with wealthier 
and more educated populations facing a growing non-
communicable disease burden. In combination, these factors 
are leading to rising demand for quality healthcare, especially 
in middle-income economies. Although health budgets are 
increasing year on year, the lack of institutional mechanisms 
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for prioritising services and spending makes attaining UHC 
all the more challenging. In response, health authorities and 
payers often set out to define benefits packages,13,14 that is, 
the services and technologies to be covered by public budgets 
including social health insurance schemes and tax-funded 
national health services. This often happens through explicit 
lists, including negative lists of technologies not covered as 
well as positive lists (also defined as benefits catalogues by 
Schreyogg et al13). Designing and adjusting benefits packages 
is an example of priority setting, that is, deciding who receives 
what healthcare at what cost.8,12
One way in which things can go wrong is exemplified by 
the role of the judiciary in priority setting. At least 115 
countries worldwide have the right to health enshrined in 
their constitutions and through legal interpretations.15,16 In 
the absence of corresponding legitimate, transparent and 
evidence-based priority setting processes, health systems 
become vulnerable to the country’s judiciary making ad hoc 
decisions on what the system ought to pay for individual 
patients, often overlooking overall budgetary and other 
constraints in making such decisions and the resulting 
impact on the availability of healthcare for the rest of the 
population. There has been, for example, a mushrooming 
of court decisions compelling the authorities to provide 
expensive, often unproven, treatments to specific individuals. 
A significant share of these cases have been about the 
delivery of services and technologies already in the benefit 
packages but which the system has been unable to finance 
and provide.15,16 However, the increasing involvement of 
the courts in individual treatment decisions and national 
policies, prioritising human rights of individual patients over 
affordability for the health system and patients as a whole, can 
undermine well-intentioned public policy and, at worst, inject 
further inequalities and inefficiencies into the healthcare 
system.17
To place local values at the heart of decision-making, 
Baltussen et al1 launched an innovative research initiative, 
REVISE 2020, which openly recognises that “…that priority 
setting is in reality a value-laden political process in which 
multiple criteria beyond cost-effectiveness are important, 
and stakeholders often justifiably disagree about the relative 
importance of these criteria.”18 Our like-minded international 
Decision Support Initiative (iDSI) (http://www.idsihealth.
org/) was established to strengthen in-country institutional 
and technical capacity together with open participative 
processes for evidence-informed policy-making.19 It takes 
the form of a collaboration between local policy-makers and 
other stakeholders for sharing experiences, methods, and 
knowledge.
Is the Problem Too Much Cost-Effectiveness Analysis?
Baltussen and colleagues1 criticise the promotion of cost-
effectiveness analysis (CEA) by global players as the 
central or even sole criterion in decision-making for all the 
aforementioned political and value reasons. Yet CEA, as a 
means of systematically assessing the benefits against the 
cost of alternative investment options, is in fact not much 
used by countries’ health authorities in making decisions 
about real-life public spending in health.8 Moving towards a 
situation where economic evidence is down-valued or even 
deprioritised over other socially acceptable considerations, 
with or without deliberation, risks throwing the baby out with 
the bathwater.
Should Scientific Value Judgements Be Context-Free?
Global approaches to CEA can hardly be too context-sensitive. 
Studies done by global players that ignore local contexts but 
nonetheless presume to advise may undermine local priorities 
and distort local spending decisions. Without in-country 
expertise for commissioning, producing and interpreting 
local data on costs and outcomes,20 globally conducted CEA 
may do more harm than good,21,22 particularly if the advice 
based on such analysis to countries carries weight because of 
the authority and standing of its authors. Standardised cost-
effectiveness decision rules arbitrarily set by global experts 
with no consideration of local budgetary constraints and 
opportunity costs,23 and based on global generalities such 
as WHO’s Generalised CEA (explicitly devised to ignore 
the local realities of current practice through introducing 
null comparators24), serve to promote badly applied cost-
effectiveness principles.
CEA is not intrinsically centralising: whether it is depends 
on the politico-legal structure of the jurisdiction and the 
corresponding governance arrangements. Further, the “one 
size fits all” question applies not only at the global versus 
country level but also within jurisdictions, even the less 
federalised ones where there are ample opportunities for local 
priorities to clash with central ones. Countries like India and 
South Africa exemplify this on a grand scale. In the case of 
South Africa, there is a relatively small budget for the National 
Department of Health, and significant devolution of budgets 
direct to provinces, alongside a sizeable private sector which 
accounts for more 50% of the spent for servicing less than 20% 
of the population.25 We, therefore, agree with Baltussen et al 
that at national level there is a critical role for “more generic 
centrally-led institutionalized processes,” convening the 
expertise and evidence in the country to inform its priority 
setting in a way that is relevant. These national processes and 
decisions not only guide local (subnational) decisions but can 
be used also to define the scope of local or provincial discretion 
in following central guidance, providing a transparent means 
through which differences both of perspective and of material 
fact can be resolved. 
The Lancet Commission on Investing in Health is another 
example of global advocacy.26 It sets out three lists of cost-
effective interventions in answer to the question of “what” 
for UHC.26 But, it is not possible (let alone desirable) to 
determine at the global level what is cost-effective or equitable 
or otherwise acceptable at country or regional level. The 
theory may be context-free but its application is not. LMICs 
are especially vulnerable because they often have very limited 
capacity to challenge the local applicability of global advice 
or to conduct independent assessments that take due account 
of local circumstances. The first question in any respectable 
guidance for carrying out CEA is, rightly, something like 
“What is the context?” or “What is the perspective?” for 
this study.27 This is as important a question in LMICs as it 
is in rich countries. Even at relatively high levels of decision-
making, for example, when prioritising health vis-à-vis 
education, the matter of resource allocation is essentially 
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one for local judgment. After such a high level process, in a 
well-planned health system of an LMIC committed to UHC, 
the public budget for health including donor contributions 
and net of any substitution of donor for national funding28 is 
then available for further prioritisation within health – and 
will need to respect, amongst other things, the constraints 
of country-specific donor-set commitments to diseases like 
HIV and technologies like vaccines, local demographics, 
local disease burden, local values with respect to equity, 
local costs of interventions, and informed local judgments 
about acceptability, feasibility, manageability and speed of 
implementation in policy and clinical practice. 
Such a more nuanced approach is not the norm even in 
existing international advisory agencies. WHO’s long 
standing process for updating its Essential Medicines List 
is another manifestation of limited relevance accorded to 
context. As a result, aspirational listing of expensive patented 
pharmaceuticals with little country or subnational guidance 
on price to ensure value for money, can often be used as a 
marketing tool by vested interests despite the well-meaning 
intentions of those access to medicines activists.29,30 
Criteria for setting priorities are matters of political and 
social judgment by those who are accountable to the citizens. 
Technical experts do not have this accountability. We, as iDSI 
and like Baltussen et al,1 subscribe to a deliberative and locally 
focused approach to decision-making, that is evidence-
informed, based on the principles of the iDSI Reference 
Case for Economic Evaluation.27 We support approaches 
that operate through transparent and independent processes 
that encourage trust and credibility. Our “one-size-fits-all” 
solutions are, therefore, set at a very high level and with the 
possibility of nuancing, for example of the degree of openness 
and participation, in keeping with such principles as those set 
out in the accountability for reasonableness framework.31 But, 
what we do not do is to advocate on behalf of particular types 
of people, categories of disease, or types of intervention or 
predetermined lists of services. Such matters are to be decided 
by countries, provinces or districts using the recommended 
methods and decision-making systems but embodying their 
own social and political values.3,31
Effective Deliberation Costs Money and Takes Time
Global experts should not dictate the priority that health 
ought to have over education or other sectors; instead, experts 
can help local decision-makers develop politically feasible, 
credible and transparent ways of making such choices. We 
are making some value judgments here – about decision-
making processes rather than the outcome of such processes. 
Similarly, within health policy, it is not for external experts 
to decide health priorities. Experts can provide tools and 
evidence, and, where appropriate, broader policy frameworks. 
Such is the 2014 WHO resolution on “Health Intervention 
and Technology Assessment in support of UHC” to support 
local capacity strengthening and local determination of health 
priorities.32
However, given the limited resources and capacity in many 
LMICs to create functioning deliberative process in the short 
run, one can begin with technocratic evidence generation 
from a small unit in a health ministry or a health insurance 
agency, aimed at influencing budgets and investment through 
providing such evidence of trade-offs to decision-makers.25,33 
Those decision-makers include individuals responsible for 
making investment decisions at a national or provincial health 
insurance agency, ministries of health and social security, 
or ministries of finance. A deliberative process including 
elements of consultation, transparency, and guarding against 
vested interests often evolves alongside attempts to generate 
the needed evidence so that the evidence is more likely to 
influence decisions,8 and both elements (economic evidence 
and due process) are needed for paving an effective path to 
influencing resource allocation.
Concluding Thoughts
CEA matters if countries care about UHC and improving 
health outcomes.12,34 However, CEA that is not based on 
local evidence is not useful and can even be harmful.21,22 A 
deliberative process taking into account local values and local 
evidence – including but not limited to CEA evidence – is the 
holy grail for country empowerment and UHC sustainability 
and is perhaps the mechanism through which to achieve 
better spending outcomes in health.12 As countries commit to 
UHC and start to contribute to this commitment financially, 
there is an opportunity for global partners to align themselves 
with the principle of context-sensitive evidence as a driver for 
better decisions, and to support technical, institutional and 
informational capacity at the local level for achieving this.25
It is not the role of global advocacy or technocratic 
institutions to pre-empt the result of local deliberative 
processes. The question can be globally put “who or what 
should get priority?” but the answer must be local. To do 
otherwise is to disenfranchise national policy-makers and 
local communities. Their answers may not be those preferred 
by the global advisers. Why should they be? After all, it is 
national policy-makers and technocrats, elected by the people 
or appointed by elected officials, respectively, who will be 
accountable for their decisions and it is probably these and 
other local stakeholders who can form the best judgments 
about what is actually feasible, sustainable and timed rightly 
for their particular situation. Our responsibility as advisers 
ought to be to facilitate governments and communities to 
realize their aspirations, not ours. They decide ends; we can 
only suggest means.
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